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December 9, 1987

Mr. Geoffrey Butler
Clerk of the Court
UTAH SUPREME COURT
332 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Dear Mr. Butler:
RE:

Memorandum of Newly Uncovered Authority
Camp v. Office of Recovery Services
Case No.: 870187

The recent case of RDG Assoc./Jorman Corp. v. Ind.
Comm. , 63 Ut. Adv. Reports 12 (Case No. 860003, August 13,
1987) is additional authority for Point III, Section 2 of
Brief of Respondent (p. 11).
Specifically, RDG Assoc, states:
We agree that a strictly literal interpretation of the statute could produce results
which would be absurd and hence were not, in
our view, intended. Consequently, the literal
scope of the statute must be narrowed. Millett
v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah
1980) Curtis v. Harmon Electronics, Inc., 575
P.2d 1044 (Utah 1978); Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah
2d 254, 255, 390 P.2d 915, 916 (1964).
Will you please bring this letter to the attention
of the court?
Sincerley,
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES

RTCH
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Carol seeks judgment that Medicaid is entitled to
no reimbursement.

Alternativelyf Carol seeks to have the

trial court's award of $3,280 upheld.

Additionally, Carol

seeks to have the case remanded for a redetermination of
attorney fees paid by Medicaid.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The case was submitted to the trial court upon
stipulated

facts,

and

upon

the

affidavits

Cavagnolo, Donna Harmon, and Robert Hansen.
are uncontradicted.
stipulated facts.

of

Sharon

The affidavits

The facts in defendant's brief are the
The additional facts contained in the

affidavits are set forth as follows:
The claim against Farmers was first made on August
5, 1985; Farmers offered $20,000 policy limits on September
3,

1985.

(R.96.)

verification

The

settlement

that Carol was

Kadel's estate.

the

was

conditioned

administrator

of

on

Tammy

Upon verification, the settlement draft was

issued to "Carol Camp as administrator of the estate of
Tammy

Kadel

and

her

legal

guardian."

(R.97.)

The

settlement was understood to include medical expenses, pain,
suffering, disfigurement, and loss of future earnings as
damages.

(R.96; 9 3-94.)

The settlement was made before Medicaid paid any
bills, or obligated itself to pay them.

In fact, Farmers

and Carol's attorneys were completely unaware that Medicaid
would eventually become involved.

(R.98; 137.)

The settlement compensated only a fraction of the
damages suffered by Carol.

(R.126.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
AT POINT I

(PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-APPEAL)

Medicaid's
inapplicable

because

statutory
Medicaid

right
had

of
not

reimbursement
paid,

or

is

become

obligated to pay, benefits at the time the claim was made.
Without a statutory lien, Medicaid's claim is governed by
common-law

subrogation.

Because

plaintiff

was

not

made

whole, Medicaid has no common law rights.

AT POINT II

(PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-APPEAL)

Medicaid is barred by statute from recovering from
the estate of a deceased recipient under 65.

Because Tammy

Kadel was under 65, Medicaid has no statutory claim.

2

AT POINT III
Because Medicaid's right of reimbursement is
triggered only to the extent that medical expenses are
claimed and recovered, the trial court correctly apportioned
the settlement.

The allocation is not claimed, nor shown, to

be erroneous or unfounded•

AT POINT IV

The trial court properly awarded attorney fees and
costs of the underlying lawsuit from Medicaid's recovery.
The claim was made before Medicaid paid became obligated to
pay medical benefits, and was therefore in compliance with
the statute.

Furthermore, the common fund doctrine requires

Medicaid to pay a reasonable attorney fee from the benefits
it receives.

AT POINT V
(PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-APPEAL)

The trial court erred in determining the attorney
fees award by failing to consider the risks taken by
plaintiff's counsel, skill of counsel and other factors.

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I
MEDICAID'S STATUTORY RIGHT TO RECOVER IS INAPPLICABLE

a.

Plaintiff did not violate 26-19-7(1)(a) because
the claim was made, and settlement reached, before
Medicaid provided, or became obligated to provide
medical assistance.
Medicaid's right to recover is limited to cases

where a claim is made against a third party after Medicaid
has paid, or became obligated to pay, medical expenses:
(L)(a) A recipient may not file a claim
or commence an action against a third
party for recovery of medical costs for
an injury, disease, or disability for
which the department has provided or has
become obligated to provide medical
assistance without the department's
written consent.
* * * *

(2) If the recipient proceeds without
the department's written consent as
required by Subsection (l)(a), the
department is not bound by any decision,
judgment,
agreement,
or
compromise
rendered or made on the claim or in the
action, and the department may recover
in full from the recipient all medical
assistance which it has provided and
shall maintain its right to commence an
independent action against the third
party, subject to Subsection 26-19-5(3).
Medicaid bears the burden of showing that the statutory right
of recovery, under 2(a), is applicable.

However, there was

no evidence that Medicaid had paid, or promised to pay
medical benefits, before the claim was made.

4

The claim

was made on August 5, 1985, and the settlement concluded by
October 4, 1985. Medicaid did not pay medical benefits until
some months after the settlement.

Thus, because Medicaid has

failed to show that the statute is applicable, they should be
denied recovery pursuant to statute.
Furthermore, the statute apparently contemplates a
situation where Medicaid has paid medical expenses prior to
the assertion of a third party claim.

If Medicaid has made

no payments, there is no reason to get consent.
nothing to consent to.

There is

Only after Medicaid has paid, is

there any reimbursement claim for which consent can be given.
This approach is consistent with a general policy
of encouraging injured persons to seek and exhaust private
sources of paying medical bills before turning to public
assistance.

For example, consider an injured person who

incurs $50,000 in medical expenses due to the negligence of a
tortfeasor with $20,000 in insurance.

The injured person

recovers the $20,000 to pay medical bills, then turns to
Medicaid who pays the rest. According to Medicaid's theory,
because the injured person proceeded without Medicaid's
consent (even though Medicaid had paid nothing at that time),
the injured person is liable to reimburse the State for the
full $30,000 in assistance received.

Thus, the injured

person winds up paying the whole $50,000. A prudent injured
person wou]d avoid this absurd result by simply asking
Medicaid to pay the whole $50,000 and let Medicaid seek
third-party recovery.

However, a better result is achieved
5

with less drain on public largess when the injured person is
encouraged to seek private funds before turning to Medicaid.
A literal reading of the statute is in harmony with that
policy.

Because Medicaid had not paid medical bills when

Carol made her claim, Medicaid has no statutory right to
reimbursement.

b.

Without a statutory lien, Medicaid can
only assert common-law subrogation.

Because Medicaid's statutory right of recovery is
inapplicable, common law principles of subrogation apply.
Under these familiar principles, Medicaid is not entitled to
recovery until Carol is made whole.

Lyon v. Hartford Ace. &

Indem. Co., 25 Ut.2d 311, 480 P.2d 739 (1971); Transamerica
Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 29 Ut.2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972).

See

also the following, which apply subrogation to Medicaid
claims:

Smith v.Alabama Medicaid Agency, 461 So.2d 817

(Ala. Civ. App.

1984); White v. Sutherland, 585 P.2d 331

(N.M. App. 1978); Hedgebeth v. Medford, 378 A.2d 226 (N.J.
1977); State v. Cowdell, 421 N.E.2d 667 (Ind. App. 1981)
(superseded by statute).
settlement.

Carol was not made whole by the

Thus, Medicaid has no common law right of

reimbursement.

6

POINT II
MEDICAID IS PROHIBITED BY STATUTE
FROM RECOVERING FROM TAMMY KADEL'S ESTATE
a.

By statute, Medicaid can only recover
from the estate of a person over 65.
Utah Code Ann., §26-19-13(2) expressly limits

Medicaid's right of recovery from the estate of a Medicaid
recipient to estates of recipients "65 years of age or older
when [the recipient] received assistance. . ."

Section

26-19-13(1) dealing with recovery from living persons is
clearly subordinated to §26-19-7 (regarding third-party
claims).

In contrast, §26-19-13(2)(recovery from estates) is

not subordinated to, or limited by, Medicaid's right of
recovery under §26-19-7.
The apparent legislative intent is to recognize
hardship cases and exempt monies in the estate of a formerly
indigent person.

For example, a widow with young children

would not be required to reimburse Medicaid from settlement
proceeds from a survival action.

The distinction between

recovering from an estate of a person over 65, and not
allowing recovery from an estate of a person under 65, is
perfectly rational and appropriate for the legislature to
make.

See Matter of Estate of Fisher, 397 A.2d 738 (N.J.

Super., Probate Part. 1978).

7

Medicaid's rights of recovery are created by
statute.

If §26-19-13(2) fails to confer a right of

recovery against the estate of a deceased recipient under 65,
this Court should not judicially create one, apart from
common law subrogation.
b.

The settlement is part of the estate of
Tammy Kadel. •*•

Defendant's argument that the settlement is not
part of Tammy Kadel's estate is misguided.

The settlement

draft is drawn to "Carol Camp as administrator of the estate
of Tammy Kadel and her legal guardian."

While a wrongful

death claim is not part of the estate of the deceased, In
Re:

Behm's Estate, 117 Utah 151 213 P.2d 657 (1950), Tammy

had a survival action for her pain and suffering and other
damages suffered by her before and upon her death.
Code Ann., §78-11-12 (1977).
of the estate.

Utah

This survival action is a part

Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death, §14.1,

(2d ed. 1975); Runyon v. Dist. of Col., 150 App. D.C. 228,
463 F.2d 1319 (1972).

The settlement draft makes no

reference to Carol Camp in her capacity as an heir under the
Wrongful Death Statute; it expressly designates her as

L

The argument raised by Medicaid that the settlement
was not part of Tammy's estate was not raised in the trial
court below. Therefore, the argument is not properly before
the court. Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488, 491 (Utah 1986);
Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 95 (Utah 1986).
8

administrator of the estate.

Therefore, the settlement was a

part of the estate, and not subject to Medicaid's claim.
Medicaid cites Shelton v. Fresno Community Hosp.,
219 Cal.Rptr. 722 (Cal.App. 5th Dist. 1985) for the
proposition that the settlement is not part of Tammy's
estate.

Shelton involved a wrongful death claim by heirs,

not a survival action on behalf of the estate.

POINT III
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, §26-19-1, ET SEQ.
REQUIRES APPORTIONMENT OF THE SETTLEMENT BETWEEN MEDICAL EXPENSES AND OTHER DAMAGES
1.

Medicaid's consent is only required for recovery of
medical costs by Carol.
A Medicaid recipient may make a claim for recovery

of "medical costs" against a third party only with the
consent of Medicaid.

Utah Code Ann., §26-19-7(1)(a) (1984).

However, if the recipient claims for general damages only, or
for special damages not including medical costs, Medicaid's
consent is apparently not required.

Icl. Additionally,

§26-19-5(5) clearly preserves the recipient's right to seek
damages not paid by Medicaid.

Thus, any claim Carol made for

non-medical and general damages did not require Medicaid's
consent.

9

2.

Medicaid's right of recovery is triggered only by a
recovery of medical expenses by Carol.
The trial court reasonably construed the statute to

require a showing of recovery of medical expenses before
allowing reimbursement.

By doing so, the court harmonized

medicaid's right of recovery with the statute's preservation
of the recipient's claim for other damages (§26-19-5(5)).

It

is appropriate to construe all aspects of a statute together
so that no individual provision is rendered ineffectual.
Peay v. Bd. of Educ. of Provo City School Dist., 14 Ut.2d 63,
577 P.2d 490 (1962); Totorica v. Thomas, 16 Ut.2d 175, 397
P.2d 984 (1965) .
A wooden reading of the statute would allow
Medicaid to demand reimbursement for medical costs whenever a
third-party claim is made by the recipient, regardless of any
actual recovery.

Section 26-19-7 requires consent before

making a claim; the penalty (reimbursement) is triggered
merely by lack of consent.

Thus, under Medicaid's

construction, if a plaintiff sought medical costs and general
damages, but the jury failed to award medical expenses,
Medicaid could still recover "in fullM from a general damage
award, simply because the recipient proceeded without
consent.

Indeed, the plaintiff might lose entirely; however,

Medicaid will still require reimbursement simply because a
claim for medical expenses was made without its consent.
10

Alternatively, a jury may award only a portion of
the medical expenses claimed to be a result of the accident.
Medicaid's interpretation would allow recovery of the entire
amount claimed, regardless of the amount actually recovered.
The trial court's decision to limit reimbursement to Medicaid
to the amount of medical expense recovered from a third party
is consistent with the principle that a statute is not to be
construed to give unjust or illogical results.

Millett v.

Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934 (Utah 1980).
Medicaid places great reliance on several Indiana
cases.

Indiana v. Guardianship of Mclntyre, 471 N.E.2d 6

(Ind. App. 4th Dist. 1984); Indiana Dept. of Public Welfare,
486 N.E.2d 546 (Ind. App. 3rd Dist. 1985).

Because Indiana

Code, 12-1-7-24.6 gives Medicaid a lien on "any recovery"
from a third party, these cases are not helpful in analyzing
Utah's statute which is limited to third-party recovery for
"medical costs."
Medicaid also cites in support of its position
Coplien v. Dept. of Health & Soc. Serv., 349 N.W.2d 92
(Wis.App. 1984).

Coplien considered a statutory scheme for

disbursement of a third party recovery which specifically
provided for full reimbursement to Medicaid in every case.
This is in sharp contrast to Utah's approach which only
requires reimbursement if medical costs are claimed.
Finally, this court should reject Medicaid's
panic-stricken argument that Medicaid recipients who do not
seek medical costs will prevent recovery of medical costs by
Medicaid.

Section 26-19-7 allows Medicaid to seek

reimbursement from a

third party despite a prior or

concurrent recovery of non-medical costs by the recipient.

3.

The trial court's allocation of the settlement between
medical and non-medical expenses is not clearly
erroneous.
Having required a showing that medical costs were

actually recovered, the trial court was faced with the
difficult factual question of whether, and to what extent, a
recovery for medical costs had been obtained.

For Carol's

claim against Farmers was not simply a claim for medical
costs.

Her claim included the pain and suffering of Tammy

for six days before her death.

It also included the grief

and anguish she suffered as a mother watching her daughter
die.

It also encompassed Tammy's lost future earnings, and

all other compensable elements of damage.
Because Carol and Farmers had not allocated any
portion of the recovery to medical expenses, the trial court
assigned a pro-rata portion of the settlement to medical
expenses.

Carol was ordered to repay this amount to

Medicaid.

Medicaid has not challenged the trial court's

determiantion as to the total value of Carol's claim, and the
percentage of that value that represents medical expenses.

4•

Medicaid's reimbursement should be based on the actual
amount it has paid.
Medicaid points out that its payments are about 16

percent of the total settlement, while the face amount of the
12

medical expenses is about 36 percent of the settlement.

The

difference arises because Medicaid pays only a portion of the
medical expenses.

The medical care provider agrees to waive

or compromise the excess as a condition of Medicaid's
payment*

Medicaid seeks to have its share based on the face

amount of the medical expenses instead of the actual amount
paid by it-

However, §26-19-5(1) and §26-19-7(2) only allow

recovery for medical assistance provided, but do not include
medical expenses waived by medical care providers•

For this

reason, the trial court limited Medicaid's recovery to the
amount it actually paid, or 16%.
Medicaid's argument would allow it to pay $25,000
in satisfaction of $50,000 in medical bills and then recover
the full $50,000 from the tortfeasor or the recipient.

This

would be an improper result that in effect allows Medicaid to
make a profit out of its charitable obligation.

The trial

court properly rejected this illogical construction of the
statute.

POINT IV
MEDICAID'S DEFENDANT'S RECOVERY SHOULD BE REDUCED
BY A REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEE AND COSTS
U.C.A. §26-19-7(4) states that Medicaid "shall pay
its proportionate share of the costs of any action. . . .
The statute also allows an attorney fee not to exceed
one-third of Medicaid's recovery.

While it is not expressly

stated, the implication is that "costs" includes a reasonable
13

attorney's fee not to exceed one-third of Medicaid's
recovery.

This makes sense because attorney fees are a cost

to a recipient of producing the recovery in which Medicaid
shares.
Medicaid's recovery should be reduced by a
reasonable attorney fee on equitable principles apart from
the statutory language.

This reduction is based in the

inherent equitable power of the court under the "common fund"
doctrine.

Under this doctrine, where a party creates a fund

through litigation in which others benefit, a reasonable
attorney fee is deducted from the share given to each party.
The [common fund] doctrine rests on the
perception that persons who obtain the
benefits of a lawsuit without
contributing to its cost are unjustly
enriched at the successful litigant's
expense. [Citation omitted.]
Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 487, 100 S.Ct. 745,
749, 62 L.Ed.2d 676 (1980).

See also, Turtle Mgt., Inc. v.

Haggis Mgt., 645 P.2d 667, 671 fn.l (Utah 1982) (recognizing
common fund doctrine and its rationale).
Dawson, "Lawyers and Involuntary Clients:

See generally,
Attorney Fees

from Funds," 87 Harvard L. Rev. 1597 (1974).
This principle underlies the well-known rule that
an insurer who seeks subrogation from its insured must pay a
reasonable attorney fee from its recovery.

See Guaranty

Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Morris, 611 P.2d 725 (Utah 1980); Street
v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 609 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1980); Lamb v.
S.Cen. Utah Tel. Ass'n., Inc., 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982).

14

Even if this case does not involve a true subrogation right,
the same principles should be applicable.
The common fund doctrine has been applied to
require other states to share in paying the attorney fees
necessary to procure a settlement from which a Medicaid
reimbursement claim is satisfied.

In requiring Medicaid to

pay a proportionate share of the plaintiff's attorney fees,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated;
Where, despite a clear right to proceed
in its own right against the tortfeasor,
the Commonwealth refrains from acting
and it is the attorney for the welfare
recipient who creates the fund from
which the Commonwealth will benefit as
subrogee, equity requires that the
Commonwealth share in the cost of
creating the fund., It would be
manifestly unjust to permit the
Commonwealth to recover its entire claim
and permit it to avoid any part of the
cost of creating the fund while
requiring the welfare recipient to pay a
disproportionately large share.
Shearer v. Moore, 419 A.2d 665, 668 (Pa. Super. 1980)
(Emphasis added); Accord, see Moss v. Glynn, 383 N.E.2d 275
(111. 1978); Hedgebeth v. Medford, 378 A.2d 226 (N.J. 1911)}
White v. Sutherland, 585 P.2d 331 (1978).
Medicaid argues that it should not pay attorney
fees because Carol failed to get its consent.

As pointed

out at Point I, above, consent was not required because
Medicaid had not paid anything when Carol obtained recovery.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina aptly
summarized the entire situation as follows:

15

11 is repugnant to fundamental
principles of equity that [parties
receiving benefits] should reap where
they have not sown, free from any legal
duty to compensate those who have made
reaping possible.
Petition of Crum, 114 S.E.2d 21, 24 (S.C. 1941).

Medicaid

should bear a reasonable, proportionate share of Carol's
attorney fees.

POINT V
DEFENDANT SHOULD PAY A PROPORTIONATE
SHARE OF PLAINTIFF'S COSTS IN "THE
CLAIM AGAINST STEVENS
U.C.A., §26-19-7(4) clearly requires Medicaid to
pay a proportionate share of the costs of the underlying
settlement.

Medicaid claims that it has no obligation to

pay costs because Carol's action was not commenced in
compliance with the statute.

However, Carol incurred the

costs before Medicaid's consent was necessary.

See Point I,

supra.

POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING
TO CONSIDER ALL RELEVANT FACTORS IN
ASSESSING A REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEE
In determining the amount of attorney fees to be
assessed against Medicaid, the trial court refused to
consider all relevant factors.

Despite a specific request,

the court refused to consider the contingent nature of
Carol's attorney's representation in calculating a reason16

able attorney fee-

Also, the court would not consider the

skill and standing of Carol's attorneys-

Instead, the trial

court merely multiplied the hours spent by a reasonable
hourly fee-

(R.174-175-)

Utah Code of Professional Responsibility DR-2-106
provides:
Factors to be considered as guides in
determining the reasonableness of a fee
include the following:
(3) The fee customarily charged in the
locality for similar legal
services.
* * * *

(7) The experience, reputation, and
ability of the lawyer- - •

*

*

*

(8) Whether the fee is fixed or
contingent.
These factors should be considered by a trial court in
computing a reasonable fee-

Cabrera v. Cobtrell, 694 P.2d

622 (Utah 1985); Kerr v- Kerr, 610 P-2d 1380 (Utah 1980).
Furthermore, this court has counselled against the
mechanical use of hours spent times hourly rate:
Reasonable attorney fees are not
measured by what an attorney actually
bills, nor is the number of hours spent
on the case determinative in computing
fees .
Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d at 624.
Many courts agree that the risk of litigation is
an important factor when a case is accepted on a contingent
fee.

Heller v. First Nat'l Bank of Denver, N.A., 657 P.2d
17

972 (Colo. App. 1982) (contingent fee contract is factor
bearing on reasonable value of attorney's services);
Jazarian v. Csapo, 483 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(complexity and risk, multiplier of 2 ) ; see generally, 57
A.L.R.3d 475, §8 and Speiser, Attorney's Fees, §8.10, p.
319, and cases cited therein.2
The trial court's reason for not considering
contingency of recovery and skill of counsel was that
Medicaid had the services of the Attorney General at its
disposal.

Thus, the court concluded, because Medicaid could

hire its own attorney and bear its own risk of litigation,
no consideration to those factors should be given.

But the

availability of alternative counsel to Medicaid is not
relevant" to the risk actually assumed by Carol's counsel.
Likewise, the recognized skill of the Attorney General's
office says nothing about the ability of counsel actually
involved in the case.
Accepting the trial court's reasoning would
completely undercut the common fund doctrine, because any
beneficiary could theoretically have hired a better
attorney, and borne any risk individually.

The fact is that

the beneficiary has not hired counsel, but has accepted the
benefit of the work of counsel of another.

The work of the

^The risk involved in a case is not always apparent at
the beginning.
In this case, what appeared to be a
straightforward wrongful death action has turned into a
complicated, drawn-out subrogation dispute.
18

attorney actually obtaining the recovery should be evaluated
on its own, without regard to what another attorney might
have done.

CONCLUSION

Medicaid should not recover from Carol because its
statutory rights of reimbursement are inapplicable.
Medicaid has no common law rights because common law
subrogation requires that Carol be made whole before
allowing recovery from her.
Should recovery be allowed, the trial court's
ruling should be affirmed.

The trial court reasonably and

fairly construed trie reimbursement statute to require
Medicaid to show an a«tual recovery of medical costs from a
third party before allowing reimbursement.

The trial

court's factual determination of the actual amount of
medical cost recovery has not been shown to be clearly
erroneous.
If the trial court is affirmed on reimbursement,
Cax-ol's attorney should be paid a reasonable attorney fee
for Medicaid.

This should be based not only on hours spent,

but on the risk inherent in the case, the skill of counsel,
and the other facts listed in DR 2-106.
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